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Abstract 
This paper presents an empirical analysis to improve our understanding of the catch-up and convergence tendencies of 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth across the Chinese provinces over 2003–2012. After controlling for the province 
heterogeneity, our regression results show that the Chinese provinces exhibit significant conditional convergence in TFP 
growth over the sample period. This indicates that province-specific factors play an important role in determining 
provincial TFP growth. Economic policies conducive to faster TFP growth should thus be directed to the relevant 
factors underlying the province heterogeneity. This paper suggests that openness to international economic activities 
and human capital accumulation are two important factors that promote TFP growth, both of which rely on a salutary 
social infrastructure. 
Keywords: economic growth, interregional disparity, total factor productivity, convergence, technology spillover 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
China has been one of the fastest growing economies in the world in the past 35 years. However, different regions in 
China have markedly different growth rates, and as a result, show substantial disparities in per capita income levels.
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What are the key driving forces behind the uneven growth? Is it growth of total factor productivity (TFP hereinafter) or 
factor accumulation that has mainly shaped the uneven regional growth? A finding of an important role of TFP in 
promoting regional growth, for example, suggests that the mere channeling of capital investment into lagging provinces 
may not ensure their faster growth unless it is associated with TFP growth (Islam and Dai, 2007). It is important for 
policymakers to gauge the relative contributions of capital accumulation and TFP growth to income growth as this 
information is useful in making necessary policies to counteract the rising trend of interregional disparity in China.  
The main objective of this paper is to explore the characteristics of interregional TFP disparity in China and to provide 
an empirical analysis that will enrich our understanding of the catch-up and convergence processes of the Chinese 
regions regarding TFP. Our empirical analysis shows that province-specific factors play an important role in 
determining provincial TFP growth. After controlling for the effects of province-specific factors, our regression results 
show that the Chinese provinces exhibited significant conditional convergence in TFP growth. Economic policies 
beneficial to faster TFP growth should thus be directed to relevant factors underlying the province heterogeneity term in 
our regression equation. Our analysis also suggests that openness to international economic activities and human capital 
accumulation are two important factors that promote TFP growth, both of which rely on a salutary social infrastructure.  
1.2 Organization 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and derive the baseline regression 
equation on which our later empirical analysis will be based. In Section 3, we present and analyze results from 
                                                        
1
 Many studies have explored the various driving forces behind economic growth and interregional inequality in China. See, for 
example, Jian, Sachs, and Warner (1996), Yao (1997), Yang (1999), DaCosta and Carroll (2001), Demurger (2001), Demurger et 
al. (2002), Huang, Kuo, and Kao (2003), Zhang and Zhang (2003), Kanbur and Zhang (2005), Wan, Lu, and Chen (2007), Zhu, 
Lai, and Fu (2008), Jiang (2010, 2011), and Fleisher, Li, and Zhao (2010).  
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regressions based on a simplified version of our baseline regression equation with no human capital variables appearing 
as explanatory variables. In Section 4, we calculate regional per worker human capital stocks and run regressions 
controlling for human capital variables. Regression results are presented and analyzed accordingly. In Section 5 we 
provide an analysis of the province heterogeneity that affects provincial TFP growth. Section 6 contains a summary and 
conclusion. 
2. The Model 
2.1 Decomposition of Per Worker Output Growth 
In this section we derive the baseline regression specification on which our subsequent empirical analysis will be based. 
To account for growth in per worker output, we assume a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function with 
Hicks-neutral TFP. For province i at time t we have 
  1)()()()()( tLtHtKtAtY iiiii                            (1) 
where Y is total output, K is the stock of physical capital, H is the stock of human capital, L is the number of workers, 
and A is the Hicks-neutral TFP. The intensive form in per worker terms is then 
 )()()()( thtktAty iiii                                    (2) 
where LYy / , LKk / , and LHh /  are output per worker, physical capital per worker, and human capital per 
worker respectively. It follows that for province i at time t growth in per worker output can be written as  
dttAddtthddttkddttyd iiii /)(ln)/)(ln()/)(ln(/)(ln                  (3) 
2.2 The Modeling of TFP Growth 
We further assume that growth of TFP for province i at time t is determined by 
ii
F
i tAtAdttAd   )](ln)([ln/)(ln                           (4) 
)(tAF  denotes China’s frontier level of TFP at time t. i  denotes an unobserved time-constant province 
heterogeneity that affects TFP growth. Therefore, equation (4) describes the convergence tendency of the Chinese 
provinces in the process of TFP growth, and the parameter   measures the speed of (conditional) convergence of 
provincial TFP: the farther the provincial TFP lags behind the national frontier level of TFP at time t, the faster the 
provincial TFP tends to grow at time t. It then follows that 
 /)1()(ln)(ln 12 iii etAetA
  dttAee F
t
t
tt
)(ln
2
1
2 
                  (5) 
where 12 tt  . For a variable x, define )()()( 121 txtxtx  , then 
)(ln)(ln)(ln)(ln 1111 tAthtkty iiii                            (6) 
Inserting equation (5) into equation (6) gives us 
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The second equality immediately follows the production function in (2). In traditional panel data notations, equation (7) 
can be rewritten as the following regression model: 
ititit bmq   ittiititit cbmq   )(                          (8) 
where the time subscript t = 1, …, )10(  . Letters q, m, and b denote logs of variables y, k and h respectively.  , 
and   are parameters to be estimated with )1(   e . ic  is a time-constant province-specific latent variable, 
t  is the time intercept, and it  is the zero-mean idiosyncratic error term. In the next two sections, we will use 
nonlinear least squares methods to estimate the values of the parameters  ,   and   based on different versions of 
equation (8).  
It should be noted that an alternative approach to examining TFP growth and convergence of the Chinese provinces 
within the framework of our model can also be applied by running regressions that have the TFP growth itAln  
directly as the left-hand side variable. This method involves explicitly calculating TFP as a residual from the production 
function, which requires an assumed value of the output elasticity of capital   a priori. In contrast, our current 
method based on equation (8) has the advantage of being able to circumvent the somewhat difficult assumptions to be 
made on the likely values of  . Instead, our current method provides an estimated value for the output elasticity of 
capital   as a byproduct through a regression based on equation (8). 
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3. Regression Results without Human Capital 
Since in growth empirics calculating human capital has always been a weak spot fraught with measurement difficulties, 
in this section we first run regressions based on a simplified version of equation (8) without including human capital in 
the equation (i.e. assuming 0 ). We will postpone including human capital in the regression equation until the next 
section. 
Our sample is 29 Chinese province-level regions over the period 2003–2012.2 We obtain from the officially published 
Chinese Statistical Yearbooks series of nominal Gross Regional Product (GRP), GRP indices, and numbers of total 
employed people for each province, based on which we calculate the values of real GRP for each province. We calculate 
real per worker output as real GRP divided by the number of total employed people. We obtain annual data on real 
provincial capital stocks, by following the method of Zhang, Wu, and Zhang (2007), and the provincial real per worker 
capital stocks can thus be calculated. 
 
Table 1. Single cross section regressions 
τ = 9  (Obs: 29)       Reg. 1-1          R2 = 0.5700 
Parameter Estimate Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval 
α 0.447 0.084 0.273 0.620 
φ –0.099 0.040 –0.181 –0.018 
τ = 9  (Obs: 29)        Reg. 1-2         R2 = 0.5799 
Parameter Estimate Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval 
α 0.455 0.089 0.271 0.640 
φ –0.073 0.056 –0.189 0.043 
Coef. on E 0.022 0.051 –0.083 0.127 
Coef. on W –0.017 0.041 –0.102 0.067 
 
3.1 Testing Absolute Convergence 
We are first interested in whether there exists absolute convergence in TFP across the Chinese regions over the sample 
period. To check this, we run a single cross section regression based on equation (8) by setting the time interval 9  
(years). This is to say the explained variable on the left-hand side is now growth of real regional per worker output over 
the entire sample period 2003–2012. Major results from the nonlinear least squares method of this single cross section 
regression is summarized in the upper half of Table 1 (Reg. 1-1). The estimated value of the output elasticity of 
(physical) capital,  , is 0.447, with a 95% interval estimate of [0.273, 0.620]. The estimated value of   is about –0.1, 
which is significantly negative at the 5% significance level. Therefore, we fail to find absolute convergence in TFP 
across the Chinese regions over 2003–2012. Instead, there exists absolute divergence in TFP across the Chinese regions 
over the sample period.  
3.2 Testing Club Convergence 
Next, we are also interested in whether there exists ‘club convergence’ in TFP across the Chinese regions over the 
sample period. We divide the Mainland China into three zones: the eastern coastal zone, the central zone, and the 
western zone. The three big zones exhibit systematic differences not only in aspects such as climate and resource 
endowment, but also in aspects such as culture, policy and exposure to foreign trade and foreign direct investment. In 
the latter half of Table 1 (Reg. 1-2), we present results of a regression that includes two zone dummy variables, E (for 
‘east’) and W (for ‘west’). E = 1 whenever the region is located in the eastern coastal zone and E = 0 otherwise, and W 
= 1 whenever the region belongs to the western zone and W = 0 otherwise. The estimated value of   from this 
regression is 0.455, with a 95% interval estimate of [0.271, 0.640], only very slightly different from its counterpart in 
Reg. 1-1. The estimated value of   is about –0.07, slightly higher than that in the previous regression and not 
significantly negative. Therefore, we fail to detect any ‘club convergence’ in TFP across the Chinese regions over the 
sample period. The estimated coefficients on the two zone dummies both have the expected sign, but neither is 
statistically significant.  
  
                                                        
2 These regions include provinces, ethnic minority autonomous regions, and province-level municipalities, but for convenience we 
call all of them ‘provinces’. Owing to missing data municipality Chongqing and province Hainan are not included in our sample. 
Applied Economics and Finance                                          Vol. 1, No. 2; 2014 
4 
 
Table 2. Pooled cross section regressions  
  τ = 1  (Obs: 261)              
 Reg. 2-1          R
2
 = 0.9621 Reg. 2-4          R
2
 = 0.9624 
Parameter Estimate 95% Conf. Interval Estimate 95% Conf. Interval 
α 0.527 0.469 0.585 0.531 0.472 0.589 
φ –0.012 –0.017 –0.006 –0.009 –0.016 –0.002 
Coef. on E --- --- --- 0.002 –0.005 0.009 
Coef. on W --- --- --- –0.002 –0.008 0.004 
  τ = 3  (Obs: 203)             
 Reg. 2-2          R
2
 = 0.5494 Reg. 2-5         R
2
 = 0.5527 
Parameter Estimate 95% Conf. Interval Estimate 95% Conf. Interval 
α 0.436 0.370 0.501 0.440 0.374 0.506 
φ –0.037 –0.050 –0.023 –0.029 –0.048 –0.010 
Coef. on E --- --- --- 0.008 –0.011 0.026 
Coef. on W --- --- --- –0.004 –0.019 0.011 
  τ = 6  (Obs: 116)              
 Reg. 2-3          R
2
 = 0.5155 Reg. 2-6         R
2
 = 0.5194 
Parameter Estimate 95% Conf. Interval Estimate 95% Conf. Interval 
α 0.396 0.307 0.485 0.401 0.310 0.492 
φ –0.074 –0.102 –0.046 –0.062 –0.101 –0.024 
Coef. on E --- --- --- 0.011 –0.026 0.049 
Coef. on W --- --- --- –0.007 –0.036 0.023 
 
3.3 More Regressions as Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of the results above, we now run pooled cross section regressions, each time setting the time 
interval 1 , 3, and 6. The regression results are summarized in Table 2. Regressions on the left-hand side of Table 2 
do not include the two zone dummies as explanatory variables while, as a comparison, regressions on the right-hand 
side of Table 2 control for the effects of the zone dummies. All regressions in Table 2 do not control for the effect of the 
province heterogeneity (for the time being), but they include (a proper number of) time dummy variables to take 
account of the time-varying intercept in equation (8). There are three major findings from the results in Table 2. First, 
for the regressions that include the zone dummies, the estimated coefficients on the zone dummies have the expected 
sign but are practically small and never statistically significant. Nor does the inclusion of the zone dummies alter the 
estimates of   and   in any significant ways. The point and interval estimates of   and   change only very 
slightly in response to the inclusion of the zone dummies. Second, the significantly negative values of ˆ  throughout 
Table 2 suggest absolute divergence in TFP across the Chinese regions over the sample period. Third, the point 
estimates of   decreases with   going from 1 to 3 to 6. However, these estimated values of   do not differ very 
much from those in Table 1.  
Next, we are going to see how regression results will change if we now control for the effects of the province 
heterogeneity. We include province dummy variables for the different provinces to take account of the latent component 
ic  in equation (8). Regression results are summarized in Table 3. The estimated values of   are now all significantly 
positive. This result suggests that once the province-specific effects are controlled for, the provinces show conditional 
convergence in TFP over the sample period. The estimated values of the output elasticity of capital,  , are somewhat 
higher than those in Table 2, and are closer to traditionally accepted values for the case of China and its regions, which 
are around 0.5.3  
  
                                                        
3 See, for example, Zheng, Hu, and Bigsten (2009) and Brandt and Zhu (2010).  
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Table 3. Pooled cross section regressions with province dummy variables 
     τ = 1  (Obs: 261)       Reg. 3-1                  R2 = 0.9725             
Parameter Estimate Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval 
α 0.553 0.031 0.491 0.614 
φ 0.092 0.031 0.031 0.154 
τ = 3  (Obs: 203)        Reg. 3-2                  R2 = 0.8153             
Parameter Estimate Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval 
α 0.467 0.034 0.401 0.534 
φ 0.638 0.076 0.489 0.787 
τ = 6  (Obs: 116)        Reg. 3-3                   R2 = 0.9437            
Parameter Estimate Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval 
α 0.491 0.043 0.405 0.576 
φ 1.190 0.137 0.916 1.463 
 
4. Including Human Capital 
4.1 The Modeling of Human Capital 
In this section, we incorporate human capital into our regression analysis. We use a simple approach to calculating 
human capital for the Chinese provinces, which follows Hall and Jones (1999) and Jiang (2012, 2014). In calculating 
per worker human capital ih  in a cross-country growth study, Hall and Jones (1999) have assumed that ih  is related 
to educational attainment by )](exp[ ii Eh  . iE  denotes the average years of schooling attained by a worker in 
economy i . Therefore, the function )(E  indicates the relative efficiency of one worker with E  years of schooling 
compared with one with zero schooling ( 0)0(  ). The derivative )(' E  is the return to schooling estimated in a 
Mincerian wage regression (Mincer, 1974). In those previous literature, )(E  is assumed to be piecewise linear, with 
the rate of return being 13.4 percent, 10.1 percent and 6.8 percent respectively for schooling of the first four years, the 
second four years, and that beyond the eighth year. These rates of return are all based on Psacharopoulos (1994)’s 
survey of evidence from many countries on return-to-schooling estimates. The rate for the first four years, 13.4 percent, 
corresponds to the average return to an additional year of schooling in sub-Saharan Africa. The rate for the second four 
years, 10.1 percent, is the average return to an additional year of schooling worldwide, while that for schooling above 
the eighth year, 6.8 percent, is taken from the average return to an additional year in the OECD.  
In this paper, our measure of per worker human capital of province i  at time t , denoted ith , is constructed as that in 
Jiang (2014) 
 j
j
it
j
itit LhLh )/1(
*
                                      (9) 
where 
*
itL  is the sum of the 
j
itL 's (where j = a, b, c, d, e). 
*
itL  denotes province i ’s population aged six and above at 
time t . We divide 
*
itL  into five groups by educational attainment: group a through group e. 
a
itL  denotes the total 
number of people aged six and above who have received zero schooling. 
b
itL  through 
e
itL  respectively denote the 
total number of people aged six and above who have received schooling up to the primary school level, the junior 
secondary school level, the senior secondary school level, and the university and higher level.
4
 ah  through 
e
h  are 
per worker human capital in each of the five groups respectively. Therefore, the provincial per worker human capital 
ith  is now a weighted average of the 
j
h ’s, with the weights being the ( */ it
j
it LL )’s. Data on these (
*
/ it
j
it LL )’s for 29 
Chinese provinces for each year during 2003–2012 are found in the official publications of the National Statistical 
Bureau of China. Constructing ith  thus implies the determination of the values of the 
j
h ’s.  
Obviously 1ah  by construction, so that 1ih  for a (fictitious) province that has only workers with zero schooling. 
We set 2bh , 6.2ch , 2.3dh , and 4.4eh  for all provinces in each year during 2003–2012. These assigned 
values of the jh ’s are calculated exactly according to the aforementioned piecewise linear rates of return to schooling 
based on Psacharopoulos (1994)’s survey, i.e. 13.4 percent, 10.1 percent and 6.8 percent for schooling of the first four 
years, the second four years, and beyond the eighth year.
5
  
4.2 Regressions with Human Capital Considered 
Results of regressions parallel to those in Tables 1 and 2 but including human capital are summarized in Table 4. There 
                                                        
4 This five-group division is performed on the provincial population aged six and above because of unavailability of data on the 
distribution of educational attainment in the provincial employed population or working-age population. 
5 Here, in calculating eh , we assume that a worker who has completed university or higher level of education has 17 years of 
schooling on average.  
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are two important findings. First, the same as before, for the regressions that include the zone dummy variables, the 
estimated coefficients on the zone dummies have the expected sign but are practically small and never statistically 
significant. Nor does the inclusion of the zone dummies alter the estimates of the other parameters in any significant 
ways. The point and interval estimates of  ,   and   change only very slightly in response to the inclusion of the 
zone dummies. Second, the estimated values of   do not have the expected positive sign, nor are they significantly 
different from zero. Compared with results in Tables 1 and 2, the inclusion of human capital in the regressions only 
alters the estimates of   and   very slightly.  
Next we run regressions parallel to those in Table 3. These are regressions that include the full set of province dummy 
variables as explanatory variables to control for the province-specific effects. Regression results are summarized in 
Table 5. Estimated values of   and   deviate very slightly from their counterparts in Table 3. The parameter   is 
not precisely estimated: only the estimated value of   for 6  (Reg. 5-3) has the expected positive sign and is 
significant. In this case, the estimate of   is quite sensitive to the setting of the time interval  . The fact that the 
parameter   is not precisely estimated plus that the estimated values are sensitive to the setting of the time interval   
may be due to a poor measurement of the provincial human capital stocks, or possibly due to a lagged effect of human 
capital formation on output, or simply due to too much multicollinearity between the explanatory variables in our 
regressions. We will come back to the issue of the linkage between human capital and TFP growth in the next section.  
 
Table 4. Cross section regressions with human capital 
τ = 1  (Obs: 261)                              
 Reg. 4-1         R
2
 = 0.9623 Reg. 4-5         R
2
 = 0.9625 
Parameter Estimate 95% Conf. Interval Estimate 95% Conf. Interval 
α 0.529 0.471 0.587 0.532 0.474 0.591 
β –0.028 –0.081 0.025 –0.028 –0.081 0.025 
φ –0.011 –0.017 –0.006 –0.009 –0.016 –0.002 
Coef. on E --- --- --- 0.002 –0.005 0.009 
Coef. on W --- --- --- –0.002 –0.008 0.004 
τ = 3  (Obs: 203)                          
 Reg. 4-2         R
2
 = 0.5723 Reg. 4-6         R
2
 = 0.5756 
Parameter Estimate 95% Conf. Interval Estimate 95% Conf. Interval 
α 0.458 0.392 0.524 0.463 0.396 0.529 
β –0.150 –0.242 –0.058 –0.151 –0.243 –0.058 
φ –0.037 –0.050 –0.023 –0.029 –0.047 0.011 
Coef. on E --- --- --- 0.009 –0.009 0.027 
Coef. on W --- --- --- –0.003 –0.018 0.012 
τ = 6  (Obs: 116)                               
 Reg. 4-3         R
2
 = 0.5167 Reg. 4-7         R
2
 = 0.5206 
Parameter Estimate 95% Conf. Interval Estimate 95% Conf. Interval 
α 0.402 0.310 0.494 0.408 0.314 0.502 
β –0.090 –0.441 0.260 –0.100 –0.478 0.277 
φ –0.073 –0.101 –0.045 –0.061 –0.100 –0.021 
Coef. on E --- --- --- 0.014 –0.025 0.052 
Coef. on W --- --- --- -0.005 –0.035 0.026 
τ = 9  (Obs: 29)                               
 Reg. 4-4         R
2
 = 0.5723 Reg. 4-8         R
2
 = 0.5829 
Parameter Estimate 95% Conf. Interval Estimate 95% Conf. Interval 
α 0.456 0.272 0.640 0.466 0.272 0.661 
β –0.172 –1.142 0.798 –0.215 –1.329 0.900 
φ –0.101 –0.183 -0.019 –0.073 –0.191 0.045 
Coef. on E --- --- --- 0.027 –0.086 0.140 
Coef. on W --- --- --- –0.014 –0.102 0.074 
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Table 5. Pooled cross section regressions with human capital and province dummies 
τ = 1  (Obs: 261)       Reg. 5-1                   R2 = 0.9726            
Parameter Estimate Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval 
α 0.555 0.031 0.493 0.616 
β –0.027 0.026 –0.077 0.024 
φ 0.092 0.031 0.030 0.154 
τ = 3  (Obs: 203)        Reg. 5-2                   R2 = 0.8292            
Parameter Estimate Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval 
α 0.493 0.033 0.428 0.559 
β –0.167 0.045 –0.256 –0.077 
φ 0.604 0.074 0.459 0.750 
τ = 6  (Obs: 116)        Reg. 5-3                   R2 = 0.9463            
Parameter Estimate Std. Err. 95% Conf. Interval 
α 0.501 0.042 0.416 0.586 
β 0.260 0.129 0.004 0.515 
φ 1.26 0.131 0.994 1.517 
 
5. The Province Heterogeneity  
5.1 Province Effect Indexes 
We have shown that conditional on the province-specific effects as picked up by the province dummy variables in the 
regressions in Tables 3 and 5, the 29 Chinese provinces exhibit clear conditional convergence in TFP growth over the 
sample period. Therefore, we are interested in seeing what factors underlie the province heterogeneity that may affect 
the rate of provincial TFP growth. Our analysis in the section is based on the estimated coefficients on the province 
dummies (i.e. the province intercepts) from the regressions in Table 3.
6
 We specifically focus on the regression under 
1  because this regression has the largest adjusted R-squared (not reported in the table) compared with other 
regressions under alternative values of  . The (normalized) estimated province intercepts from this regression is listed 
in Table 6. We have normalized the intercept for Beijing to zero. We call these values of the province intercepts the 
‘province effect indexes’. The difference between the highest value of these indexes (Shanghai) and the lowest value 
(Sichuan) is roughly 0.22.  
5.2 Province Effects versus Geographical Locations 
First we investigate how the province-specific effects are related to the geographical locations of the provinces. 
Regressing the province effect indexes on the two zone dummy variables E and W, we find that the estimated 
coefficient on E is significantly positive, being 0.049 with a 95% confidence interval of [0.015, 0.083], and the 
estimated coefficient on W has the expected negative sign but is not significantly different from zero. This result of the 
simple exercise roughly shows that the expected value of the province effect index will be higher by about 0.05 for a 
coastal province than an inland province. Regressing the province effect indexes on E alone produces an even clearer 
picture: the estimated coefficient on E is now 0.060 with a 95% confidence interval of [0.031, 0.088]. The R-squared of 
this latter regression is 0.41, showing that the zone dummy E alone explains over 40 percent of the sample variation in 
the province-specific effects. This result leads us to see that the eastern coastal provinces tend to have faster TFP growth 
over the sample period.  
  
                                                        
6 We could as well use the estimated coefficients on the province dummies from the regressions in Table 5 because it has been 
shown that whether or not we have the human capital variables in the regression equation makes no significant difference as to the 
estimated values of the coefficients on the province dummies.  
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Table 6. Calculated province effect indexes 
Province effect index Province effect index 
Beijing 0 Henan –0.0505 
Tianjin 0.0562 Hubei –0.0108 
Hebei 0.0067 Hunan –0.0249 
Shanxi –0.0424 Guangdong –0.0033 
Inner Mongolia 0.0037 Guangxi –0.0418 
Liaoning 0.0936 Sichuan –0.1100 
Jilin 0.0224 Guizhou –0.0733 
Heilongjiang 0.0138 Yunnan 0.0046 
Shanghai 0.1096 Tibet –0.0400 
Jiangsu 0.0181 Shaanxi –0.0195 
Zhejiang 0.0097 Gansu –0.0332 
Anhui –0.0093 Qinghai –0.0521 
Fujian 0.0355 Ningxia –0.0032 
Jiangxi –0.0346 Xinjiang –0.0207 
Shandong –0.0042   
 
5.3 Province Effects versus Human Capital 
Next, we are interested in seeing how the province-specific effects are related to the provinces’ human capital stocks. 
We thus run a regression of the province effect indexes on the provinces’ initial per worker human capital stocks (in 
logs) in 2003. The regression produces a significantly positive estimated coefficient on the latter, which is 0.178 with 
the 95% interval estimate being [0.063, 0.294]. The R-squared of this regression is 0.27, showing that the initial per 
worker human capital stock alone explains nearly 30 percent of the total sample variation in the province-specific 
effects. The sample correlation coefficient between the logs of the initial per worker human capital stocks and the 
province effect indexes is 0.52.  
5.4 Province Effects versus Preferential Policy 
Since the province-specific effects are supposed to capture ‘permanent’ or stable geographical, social, institutional, and 
policy differences across the Chinese provinces, our conjecture is that relatively higher values of the province effect 
indexes for the coastal provinces are due to more exposure of these provinces to international economic activities such 
as foreign direct investment and foreign trade, which in turn rely heavily on the favorable geographical locations of 
these coastal provinces and the preferential policies they receive. Demurger et al. (2002) have constructed a set of 
preferential policy indexes for the Chinese provinces to study the effect of open-door preferential policies on provincial 
economic performance.
7
 We run a regression of the province effect index on the preferential policy index and find that 
the estimated coefficient on the latter is significantly positive, which is 0.035 with a 95% confidence interval of [0.013, 
0.057].
8
 The R-squared of this regression is 0.28, showing that the provincial preferential policy index explains nearly 
30 percent of the sample variation in the province-specific effects. Not surprisingly, this result suggests that open-door 
preferential policies (coupled with favorable geographical locations) of the eastern coastal provinces are conducive to 
TFP growth by enhancing the exposure of these provinces to foreign direct investment and foreign trade, which in turn 
facilitate technology spillovers. 
5.5 Social Infrastructure as the key Determinant of Human Capital Accumulation 
In addition, according to our analysis above, we strongly suspect that the province-specific factors embodied in the 
province effect indexes, i.e. the ‘permanent’ or stable geographical, social, institutional, and policy differences across 
the Chinese provinces, affect human capital accumulation in the provinces. This is in fact what the central idea of Hall 
and Jones (1999) is: differences in capital accumulation, productivity, and therefore output per worker are 
fundamentally related to differences in social infrastructure across economies. According to Hall and Jones (1999), 
                                                        
7 Demurger et al. (2002) stress that their construction of the index is restricted to purely open-door preferential policies and does not 
take into account other factors, such as the business environment. They also point out that disentangling geography and policy is 
not an easy task because preferential treatments are obviously related to geography.  
8 See Table 11 of Demurger et al. (2002) for the values of the preferential policy indexes. The specific value for each province is 
calculated as the average of an evaluation of the province’s preferential policy environment on a 0-3 scale for each of the years 
over 1978–1998. Therefore, the preferential policy index of Demurger et al. (2002) to a large extent reflects the stable or 
‘permanent’ provincial preferential policy environment for the sample period of our analysis.  
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social infrastructure refers to the institutions and government policies that determine the economic environment within 
which individuals accumulate skills, and firms accumulate capital and produce output. Therefore, as far as human 
capital is concerned, a social infrastructure favorable to high levels of output per worker should encourage educational 
attainment by ensuring that individuals capture the social returns to their education as private returns. A higher level of 
provincial educational attainment in turn facilitates provincial TFP growth by, for example, increasing the provincial 
absorptive capacity regarding foreign technology spillovers.
9
 Further studies on the relations between social 
infrastructure, human capital, and TFP growth for the Chinese provinces are on our future agenda.   
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we explore the characteristics of interregional TFP disparity in China and provide a related empirical 
analysis to enrich our understanding of the catch-up and convergence tendencies of the Chinese regions in terms of TFP. 
We build our baseline regression model on the basis of the Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function with 
Hicks-neutral TFP, where growth of per worker output is divided into growth of per worker capital accumulation and 
growth of TFP.  
Our regression analysis fails to detect any absolute convergence in TFP across the Chinese provinces over the sample 
period. Provinces that had higher levels of TFP initially tended to experience faster growth in TFP over the sample 
period. However, after controlling for the province heterogeneity, our regression results show that the Chinese provinces 
exhibited significant conditional convergence in TFP growth. This indicates that province-specific factors play an 
important role in determining provincial TFP growth. The important policy implication of our regression results is that 
economic policies conducive to faster TFP growth should thus be directed to the relevant factors underlying the 
province heterogeneity.  
We conjecture that relatively higher values of the province effect indexes for the coastal provinces are due to more 
exposure of these provinces to international economic activities such as foreign direct investment and foreign trade, 
which are dependent on the favorable geographical locations of these coastal provinces and the preferential policies 
they receive. Our empirical analysis accordingly suggests that open-door preferential policies coupled with favorable 
geographical locations of the eastern coastal provinces are conducive to TFP growth by enhancing the exposure of these 
provinces to foreign direct investment and foreign trade, which in turn facilitate technology spillovers.  
As a byproduct, our regressions have shown a large (direct) contribution of physical capital accumulation to output 
growth.10 The regressions have all produced values of the output elasticity of physical capital   that are consistent 
with its empirically accepted values. In addition, although owing to imprecise estimations we have failed to show a 
direct contribution to output growth of human capital as an accumulable production input, our empirical analysis does 
suggest that human capital accumulation is associated with TFP growth: a higher level of provincial per worker human 
capital stock promotes provincial TFP growth by increasing the provincial absorptive capacity of technology diffusion 
from technologically advanced countries. Further studies on the linkage between the economic environment and policy, 
openness, human capital, and TFP growth for the Chinese provinces are on our future agenda.     
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